Making the Most of High Inflation by Charemza, WW et al.
CENTRE FOR COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 
E&BWP 
 
 
 
UCL SSEES 
Centre for Comparative Economics 
 
 
Making the Most of High Inflation 
 
Wojciech W. Charemza a 
Svetlana Makarova b 
Imran Shah c 
 
 
 
a University of Leicester, UK, corresponding author: 
 Department of Economics, University road,  Leicester LE1 7RH, UK 
 Phone: +44 116 252 2899; email: wch@le.ac.uk 
b University College London, SSEES, UK; email: s.makarova@ucl.ac.uk  
c
 University of Bristol, UK; email: Imran.Shah@bristol.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Economics and Business Working Paper No.124 
April 2013 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Comparative Economics 
UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
Gower Street, London,  WC1E 6BT 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 8519 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 8777 
  
 2 
Making the Most of High Inflation 
 
Wojciech W. Charemza, Svetlana Makarova, Imran Shah  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper analyses inflationary real effects in situation where there are frequent 
episodes of high inflation. It is conjectured with the increase in high inflation, and 
when differences between the expected and output-neutral inflation become large, 
output stimulation through inflationary shocks is more effective than otherwise. It is 
shown that this conjecture is valid for most countries with high inflation episodes, 
where inflation is greater than 4.8% for at least 25% of quarterly observations. This 
leads to a simple policy prescription that anti-inflationary monetary decisions should 
be undertaken in periods where the expected inflation exceeds output-neutral. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Investigations of the nature and strength of the relationship between inflation and real sphere generates, 
so far, more questions than answers. On the theoretical side, there are two main streams of the literature: 
(1) following Tobin’s (1965) argument that under high inflation wealth is likely to be reallocated from 
money to physical capital, which stimulates growth, and (2) following Sidrauski (1967), that the Tobin 
effect is offset by increased consumption (as holding real balances is costly), creating superneutrality of 
inflation. Even more pessimistic views have been developed from the early papers by Brock (1974) that 
endogenous labour supply stimulates a negative inflation-output relationship by reducing the cost of 
leisure and Stockman’s (1981) ‘cash in advance’ approach, in which investment transactions becomes 
more costly under raising inflation, negatively affecting output.  
The empirical findings are mostly on the side of the pessimists: the statement that loosely defined ‘high’ 
inflation is bad for growth is practically universal. This is evident from the comparative survey of early 
results by Braumann (2000) and also from later findings (see e.g. Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001; Grier 
and Grier, 2006, Gillman and Harris, 2010 for the developing and transition economies). However, early 
results by Bruno and Easterly (1996 and 1998) indicate that periods of high inflation (but not 
hyperinflation) were often followed by growth in the long-run. Also, for some Asian countries recent 
empirical findings point out at neutrality (Kun, 2012). It is then quite natural that the empirical literature 
focuses on finding the threshold above which inflation might be harmful for growth. Most of the 
research implicitly assumes that such threshold is common for a relatively large group of countries and 
applies the cross-sectional or panel data methods in order to identify it (see e.g. Sarel, 1995; Khan and 
Senhadji, 2001; Russeau and Wahtel 2002; Vaona and Schiavo, 2007; Bick, 2010; Kremer et al. 2012).  
In this paper we have attempted to look at the eventual stimulative effects of high inflation more closely. 
The hypothesis is straightforward and well researched: positive real effects can indeed follow periods of 
high inflation, as the inflationary expectations generate inflation surprises. However, we look at the 
surprises in rather refined way, distinguishing between the output-active and output-neutral expected 
(core) inflations. Concluding from Fischer and Modigliani (1978) we have assumed that the institutional 
country-specific effects like taxation, financial systems, corruption levels, differences in reporting 
(resulting in different money illusion effects) etc. are important enough to create individual conditions 
for the development of inflationary real effects. Hence, we analyse such effects for separate countries 
rather than for panels.  
The empirical methodology is simple. Using a two-equation vector autoregressive model for inflation 
and output we identify the shocks and estimate the expected and output-neutral (core) inflations (see 
Blanchard and Quah, 1989, Quah and Vahey,1995; Charemza and Makarova, 2006). Next, using 
intuitive conjecture that unexpected and not output-neutral inflation creates a real effect, we formulate 
the inflationary real effect gauge (IREG), which is defined as the difference between the expected and 
output-neutral inflations. We formulate the IREG hypothesis which states that inflationary shocks in the 
period of positive IREG create real effects greater than in the period of negative IREG. The hypothesis is 
tested through comparing cumulative asymmetric impulse responses which account separately for the 
periods of positive and negative IREG’s. 
Finally, why the title? Suppose that a country experiencing episodes of high inflation decides to 
implement inflation targeting. Whether inflation targeting is successful for the developed countries is 
subject to a debate (see Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Willard, 2012); for the developing countries the results 
are more encouraging (Gonçalves and Salles, 2008; Lin and Ye, 2009; Kun, 2012). If the IREG 
hypothesis is confirmed then, if a country is within an episode of high inflation and IREG is positive, the 
monetary authorities can make the most of inflation by raising the interest rate. This would reduce 
inflation and won’t affect output as strongly as if the decision is made when IREG is negative. 
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Analogously, decreasing interest rate in the period where IREG is positive would stimulate output 
growth more than a similar decision made where IREG is negative. 
From the initial set of 45 countries we have selected 17 where there were marked episodes of high 
inflation. By the episodes of high inflation we mean the cases where 0.75 quantile of annual inflation is 
equal to at least 7.5%. We use quarterly data and inflation has been defined as the annual inflation 
measured quarterly. For these countries IREG’s have been computed and asymmetric impulse responses 
of output to inflationary shocks evaluated separately for the periods where IREG is positive and 
negative. For the countries selected there is a strong positive correlation between the differences in these 
cumulative impulse responses and the logarithm of the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation. In another words, we 
have shown that, if a country experiences periods of high inflation, it becomes relevant to pay attention 
to the differences between the expected and output-neutral inflation and make anti-inflationary decision 
in the periods where this difference is positive. The higher inflation becomes, the stronger is the 
conclusion above. 
We have also checked whether such correlation is not just a facade for the high inflation effect, in the 
sense that episodes of high inflation simply coincide with the periods of positive IREG, and anti-
inflationary decisions should be made when inflation is rising. For the selected 17 countries we have 
calculated correlation between the differences in asymmetric impulse responses for the cases where 
IREG is positive and for the cases where inflation is above its median, and the logarithm of the 0.75
th
 
quantile of inflation. If IREG was a spurious concept, this correlation should be similar to the previous 
one, that is between differences in the cumulative impulse responses for periods of high and low 
inflation and the logarithm of the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation. In fact it is markedly lower, suggesting the 
operational relevance of the concept of IREG. We have also experimented with softening the definition 
of ‘episodes of high inflation’ by gradually lowering the 7.5% threshold for the 0.75th quantile. It turned 
out that our results are robust until the 4.8% threshold. 
Further structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the main concepts and definitions, most 
notably for IREG. Section 3 briefly discusses the data and introduces our understanding of countries 
with high inflation episodes. Section 4 outlines results of the impulse response estimation and more 
detailed results for three benchmark countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. Section 5 gives the 
summary of the IREG estimates for countries with episodes of high inflation and the results of the 
possible lowering of the high inflation threshold and misspecification due to overlaps of periods of 
positive IREG with periods of high inflation. Section 6 provides a simple policy prescription.  
2. EXPECTED AND NEUTRAL INFLATIONS AND IMPULSE RESPONSES  
The intuition of output-neutral inflation and IREG can be explained by a simple short-run representation 
of a typical aggregate supply function, supported indirectly or directly, by a plethora of papers from the 
seminal works of Lucas (1972) and Bull and Frydman (1983) and to thoroughly microfounded 
approaches by Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2011): 
 ( )nt t ty       ,   0    ,        (1)  
where ty  is a measure of output dynamics (net of systematic effects), t  is headline (observed) inflation 
and output-neutral inflation is n
t . Evidently: 
 e
t t t       ,          (2) 
where t  is a shock unexpected at t-1. However, in an economy with sticky prices, some individual 
relative prices cannot be fully adjusted after a shock and could have long-lasting effects on output, even 
if fully expected. Consequently, another decomposition of t  is:  
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n
t t t       ,   (3) 
where 
t  is the non-neutral component of inflation. The evaluation of 
n
t  is also based on information 
available at time t-1. Referring to the seminal literature on inflation decomposition, e
t  is similar to core 
inflation in the sense of Eckstein (1981), i.e. the systematic (predictable) component of the increase in 
production costs. In turn, n
t  is analogous to core inflation in the sense of Quah and Vahey (1995), i.e. 
the component of expected inflation which does not cause a real effect in the medium and long-run. 
Substituting (2) in (1) and bearing in mind that output-neutral component of inflation is evaluated on the 
basis of information available at time t-1, we get: 
 1 1( ) ( )
e n e n
t t t t t t tE y E                 ,    (4) 
where 
1tE   denotes an expected value conditional on observations available at time t-1.  
The relationship (4) gives rise to defining the inflationary real effect gauge, IREG, as:  
e n
t t tIREG       ,          
so that, interpreting (4), the positive difference between the expected and output-neutral inflations 
indicates that an increase in output is expected for time t.  
Simple linear form of IREG suggests that that its real effects might be particularly substantial when 
inflation is high. Inflationary expectations develop reasonably quickly, while output-neutral inflation can 
be lagging behind, due to the usual sluggishness, contracts and institutional constraints. Hence, it can be 
conjectured that the effects of IREG might be particularly evident in developing economies with a 
reasonably well developed, albeit inefficient, state sector.  
One way of computing n
t  is similar to that derived from the Quah and Vahey (1995) structural 
decomposition of a stationary vector autoregressive model. Suppose that such VAR model can be written 
as: 
( ) t tA L Z K U     ,          (5) 
where 
' [ ]t t tZ y  , A(L) is the lag polynomial operator, 1 2' [ ]K k k  the vector of constants and 
'
1 2[ ]t t tU u u  are innovations with zero expectations and variance-covariance matrix  . 
Since tZ  is stationary, its moving average representation is unique and can be recovered by inverting (5) 
as: 
( )t tZ M C L U     ,         (6) 
where L  is the lag operator, 
1 (1) (2) 2( ) ( ) ...C L A L I C L C L      , I being the identity matrix, and 
1 2[ , ] (1)tM m m EZ C K   . Then the expected inflation 
e
t  defined by (2) can be recovered from (6) 
by applying operator 
1tE   (so that 1( ) 0t tE U  ) and taking the second component, that is: 
1
( )
1
[0,1]
t
e i i
t i
i
M C LU


 
   
 
        (7) 
Recovering the output- neutral inflation 
n
t  defined by (3) is based on the methodology suggested by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) and then modified further by Gartner and Wehinger (1998) and Charemza 
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and Makarova (2006). Under the assumption of long-run output neutrality of n
t , the stationary process 
tZ  can be decomposed into the unitary innovations given by: 
( )t tZ M L      ,          (8) 
where: (0) (1) (2) 2( )L L L      , 1 2[ , ]t t t    , t tE I    and, additionally, with zero 
restrictions imposed by the long-run output-neutrality of inflation on the upper-right element of the long-
run matrix ( )(1) i
i
   , that is: 
11(0) (1) (2)
21 22
0
(1)

 
 
         
 
   .      (9) 
Matrix (1)  can be easily computed as the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of (1) (1)C C  . The element 
2t  can be interpreted as output-neutral component of innovations in (8) and therefore vector 
2[0 , ]
n
t t    can be interpreted as output-neutral part of unitary innovations t . The corresponding 
output-neutral component n
tU  of moving average innovations tU  given by (6) can then be identified by 
comparing (6) with (8) as: 
1 1 1
0 0
0 1
n n
t t tU C C CU
        
 
.       (10) 
Then output-neutral component of inflation is recovered by combining (6) with (10) as: 
1
( )
1
[0,1]
t
n i i n
t i
i
M C LU


 
   
 
        (11) 
So that, IREGt can be estimated as: 
 
1
( )
1
[0,1]
t
e n i i n
t t t i i
i
IREG C L U U 


        .      (12) 
Consequently, estimation of IREG consists of (i) estimation of the VAR model (5) and its moving 
average representation (6), (ii) computing the expected and output-neutral inflations using (7) and (11) 
and (iii) computing IREG from (12) .  
In this paper the IREG hypothesis is tested by evaluating whether the cumulative real effect of 
inflationary shocks which appear in periods of positive IREG is different (possibly greater) than that in 
periods of negative IREG. Denote t t 
   if 1 1
e n
t t   ; 0 otherwise, and t t 
   if 1 1
e n
t t   ; 0 
otherwise. Clearly t t t  
   . The conjecture is that if the cumulative impulse response of yt on t

 is 
positive and greater than that on t

, it is a confirmation of the IREG hypothesis. 
We traditionally define impulse response (IR) as a response of one variable to an impulse in another 
variable (see e.g. Hamilton, 1994, p. 319; Lütkepohl, 2006, p. 51). We are assuming stationarity here, so 
that IR’s are independent from time. Let the impulse response ( , )xIR z h  denotes an expected change in x 
in reaction to a unitary shock in z after h periods (h=1,2,…,H) and the cumulative impulse response be 
1
( , ) ( , )
H
x x
h
CIR z H IR z h

 . The IREG hypotheses can be formulated as ( , ) ( , )y yCIR H CIR H 
  , 
where { }, { }t t   
     . 
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The general definition of impulse response gives room to various practical implementations and 
techniques, too numerous to list them here. In this paper we consider two alternative ways of computing 
impulse responses. The first one is that of Jordà (2005 and 2009), as a direct linear projection of the 
effect of shock in time t to t+h by forecasting of yt+h with and without a shock, and the second is more 
traditional orthogonal impulse response, through the moving average representation of a VAR, 
orthogonalizing its right-hand side and collecting relevant coefficients (see e.g. Lütkepohl, 2006, p.56-
58). In each case identification of shocks has to be achieved, somewhat arbitrarily. Following the 
mainstream approach, in both methods we have identified shocks from the model residuals recursively, 
by applying Cholesky decomposition. Further in the text we denote the direct projection cumulative IR’s 
by ( , )DxCIR z H  and orthogonal cumulative IR’s as ( , )
O
xCIR z H .  
In order to diversify effects of t
  and t
  shocks we have applied the concept analogous to that of the 
asymmetric generalized impulse responses by Hatemi-J (2011). We have computed ( , )DyCIR H
 , 
( , )DyCIR H
 , ( , )OyCIR H
  and ( , )OyCIR H
  from the 3-equation VAR’s formulated for yt, t
  and 
t
 . These VAR’s have been estimated by the multivariate least squares and the IR’s have been 
computed using software available.
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3. DATA AND COUNTRIES WITH HIGH INFATION EPISODES 
Our main database consists of quarterly data on annual inflation and GDP growth (again, annual and 
measured quarterly) for 45 countries. All data end in 2011q4 and the length of the series varies between 
124 observations (since 1981q1) for most countries to 60 (for Ireland, since 1997q1). Data, their sources 
and recalculations are described in Appendix A. For some countries data are far from perfect. For India 
and Pakistan it was necessary to interpolate some GDP quarterly data from annual figures. In these cases 
we use polynomial (quadratic) interpolation. For some countries, e.g Argentina, inflation data are 
deemed to be unreliable and biased (see Cavallo, 2012, and numerous reports in professional press, e.g. 
The Economist and Wall Street Journal). Despite of this we have decided to use the official data here, in 
order to keep the manipulation of the official data to minimum. 
Within the main database we have identified countries with relatively frequent episodes of high 
inflation. We have initially defined such countries as where, within the data span, the 0.75
th
 quantile of 
inflation was at least equal to 7.5%. In another words, a country with frequent episodes of high inflation 
(FEHI) is where in at least 25% cases annual inflation was higher than 7.5%. Appendix A lists all these 
countries with the corresponding average and 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation.  
Contrary to popular tradition, we did not test the series for unit roots. The evidence of stationarity (or 
not) of inflation and GDP growth is so mixed and inconclusive (see e.g. Christopoulos and Tsionas, 
2004, Charemza, Hristova and Burridge, 2005; Basher and Westerlund, 2008, Beechey and Österholm, 
2008, Cook, 2009, and others), that we have decided not to enter this dispute. As most of the 
contemporary evidence suggests stationarity, we have assumed that the series we use are stationary. 
4. ESTIMATES OF IREG AND ASYMMETRIC IMPULSE RESPONSES 
For each country in the database we have computed IREG from (12). The parameters of this VAR model 
have been traditionally estimated by the multivariate least squares method, and the moving average 
representation has been obtained from (6) by truncating after the 1,000
th
 elements. Regarding the 
selection of the optimal lag, we have deviated somehow from the established tradition of using 
information criteria (Akaike and Schwartz Bayesian criteria) and decided to select the VAR lags 
according to the criterion of the minimum autocorrelation of the residuals. For the estimation of IREG it 
                                                          
1
 We have adopted GAUSS procedures written by Òscar Jordà for the computing direct IR’s and available at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/jorda/pubs.html and Thierry Roncalli’s procedures for the orthogonal IR’s (see 
Roncalli, 1995).  
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is essential to have residuals with a minimum of autocorrelation, as this is the crucial assumption in 
identifying e
t  and 
n
t  from (7) and (11). Moreover, the optimal lag length under this criterion is usually 
shorter than that given by the information criteria, which is important for the relatively short series of 
data we use. More precisely, as the lag selection criterion we have used the maximum p-value of the 
Hosking (1980) modification of the multivariate Ljung-Box portmanteau test, which seems to have 
better small sample properties than the alternatives (see Hatemi-J, 2004; for description see Lütkepohl, 
2006, p. 171). Summary of estimation results are given in Appendix B, with the lag lengths of the VARs, 
absolute values of the roots of the polynomials of the VAR parameters matrices (as measures of VAR 
stability, see Lütkepohl, 2006, p. 17), p-values for univariate and bivariate Ljung-Box autocorrelation 
portmanteau statistics, and p-values of Jarque-Bera normality statistics. For all countries the minimal 
root of the polynomial is outside the unit circle, which indicates stability. For the overwhelming 
majority of countries there is no indication of autocorrelation in residuals of individual series, although 
the results of the joint test are less favourable. Moreover, p-values of the normality statistics for the 
residuals often suggest non-normality, which in turn makes the results of further testing less reliable.  
We have presented here more results of IREG estimation for three representative Asian countries 
describing different patterns of development and different attitudes towards the monetary policy: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. During the period investigated Indonesia and Pakistan exhibit 
evidence of high inflation and, using the classification introduced in Section 3, are regarded as countries 
with frequent episodes of high inflation (FEHI), while Malaysia, with a markedly lower average 
inflation, is used as benchmark for comparison. Below we outline briefly the development of inflation 
and causes for its increases in these three countries.  
Indonesia 
Indonesia was in a deep economic recession due to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. As the result, 
Indonesia experienced a massive depreciation in its currency causing the stock market to collapse. The 
economy was in unstable financial position because of Indonesian corporations’ foreign currencies 
borrowing practices without hedging against devaluation. The rate of inflation increased sharply and 
reached about 80% in mid-1997. In response, Bank of Indonesia raised the interest rate to around 70%. 
Indonesian GDP growth rapidly declined witnessing negative economic growth of over 13% in 1998. 
After the crisis Indonesia has introduced a wide range of institutional reforms and redirected monetary 
policy towards maintaining price and exchange rate stability. As the result, price stability has been, to an 
extent, reinstated. However, the annual economic growth rate in 2001 slipped to about 3.5% with the 
inflation rate of around 13%. In the fourth quarter of 2005 Indonesia experienced a minor crisis due to 
international oil shock coupled with high imports. The Indonesian government was forced by IMF to cut 
its oil subsidies to stabilize the economic situation, but the economy responded by sharp inflation rise of 
17%. After that, economic growth started to increase. The Bank of Indonesia had officially launched its 
inflation targeting policy in July 2005. In the wake of the economic crisis, the Bank of Indonesia has 
been granted both goal and tool independence as a part of conditionality of the International Monetary 
Fund’s rescue package. It is now regarded as a country belonging to the so-called inflation control group 
(see Lin and Ye, 2009 but definitions and classifications very; see e.g Brito and Bystedt, 2010). 
Malaysia 
Unlike Indonesia and Pakistan, Malaysian economy has not experienced episodes of substantially high 
inflation. Since 1991 inflation rate averaged 2.9%. In 1990, oil price shock as a result of Gulf war 
increased Malaysian inflation merely to 4.75% in 1991. Malaysia has been comparatively successful in 
balancing strong economic growth with moderate levels of inflation in the periods preceding and 
following the Asian financial crisis. During the Asian crisis in 1997-98 inflation was well controlled and 
increased only to around 5%. After facing an economic recession for about two years since 1997, 
Malaysian economy has begun to pick up again from the third quarter of 1999. Inflation rate started to 
accelerate slightly since 2005 when the world oil prices rose, but it exceeded 5% only occasionally.  
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Pakistan 
Low and moderate inflation had been typical for the Pakistan economy until the end of 2007. Average 
annual inflation was above 11% for only 8 out the past 28 years. Average annual real per capita income 
growth was 2.8%. However, years after 2007 have been more turbulent. Inflation triggered by increasing 
worldwide petrol prices reached 25% in the second half of 2008. In 2009-20011 inflation was slightly 
reduced, but still above 10%, due to increase in agriculture prices and industrial uncertainties caused by 
political instability. At the same time the GDP growth was remarkably stable, at around 7.5% with little 
variation. 
Figure 1 shows confidence intervals (± two standard deviations around the computed value of IREG) 
obtained by pairwise bootstrap applied to the residuals of the VAR model for 1,000 resamplings. For 
most periods, the confidence intervals include zero, which means that the hypothesis that the true values 
of IREG is equal to zero cannot be rejected. However, for Indonesia, IREG is highly significant for the 
period 1998q3-1999q1. Inflation in this period was not markedly higher than for the remaining quarters 
of 1998 and 1999. For Malaysia there are some signs of significance for 1995q2-1997q3, and for 
Pakistan for 1997q2-q3 and 2007q3-2008q1. For Malaysia, as for Indonesia, inflation in the period of 
significant IREG was in line with inflation in the neighbouring quarters. For Pakistan, in 1997, IREG 
significance corresponds to a local peak in inflation, and for 2007q3-q4 it coincides with a period of 
gradually rising inflation, which reached its peak in the second half of 2008.  
After evaluating of IREG for all 45 countries, cumulative (for 24 periods) asymmetric impulse responses 
of the inflationary shocks on output, separately for t
  and t
 , have been 
 
Figure 1: IREG and 2 st.dev. bootstrapped confidence intervals  
Indonesia Malaysia Pakistan 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
computed by two methods introduced in Section 2, that is by direct projection and orthogonalization. 
Table C1 in Appendix C shows the cumulative impulse responses obtained by direct projection, that is 
( ,24)DyCIR 
 , ( ,24)DyCIR 
 , cumulative variance decomposition of particular shocks in proportion of 
the total cumulative variance of yt denoted as { ( )}
D
yV IR 
 , { ( )}DyV IR 
 , and Jordà’s (2009) statistics 
(with p-values) for testing the null hypotheses that (i) ( , ) ( , )D Dy yIR h IR h 
   jointly for all h (the joint 
test), and (ii) ( ,24) ( ,24)D Dy yCIR CIR 
   (the cumulative test). Table C2 shows the orthogonal 
cumulative impulse responses ( ,24)OyCIR 
 , ( ,24)OyCIR 
  and corresponding variance decompositions 
{ ( )}OyV IR 
 , { ( )}OyV IR 
 . The joint significance test rejects the null at the 10% level for only 4 
countries: Hong Kong, Israel, Peru and Slovak Republic. The cumulative test rejects the null more 
frequently: for Belgium, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Morocco, Philippines, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Turkey,UK and USA. Likely reason for such surprisingly low level of significant results can be the 
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underlying assumption that the impulse responses have joint multivariate normal distribution which, in 
case of relatively short time series and clearly non-normal distribution of VAR residuals, might be 
somewhat stretchy. 
Figure 2 presents ( , )DyIR h
  and ( , )DyIR h
  , h = 1, 2,…, 24, together with confidence intervals around 
( , )DyIR h
  for the representative countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. If ( , )DyIR h
  band is 
outside the intervals, this suggests individual significance of the differences between ( , )DyIR h
  and 
( , )DyIR h
  in the sense that the hypothesis ( , ) ( , )D Dy yIR h IR h 
   is to be rejected for the particular h. 
We present the simultaneous Scheffé bands and conditional Jordà bands (for detailed description of both  
see Jordà, 2009). The Scheffé bands are in the form of a fan-chart (respectively with 95%, 50% and 25% 
confidence intervals) and Jordà bands are for the 90% confidence interval. The reason for plotting 
different Scheffé bands is that, due to their construction as simultaneous bands, particular different 
intervals might cross, so that presenting different confidence intervals gives a clearer picture of the 
uncertainties related to the impulse responses.  
Despite of the fact that the conditional Jordà bands are narrower than the marginal bands (not reported 
here) or Scheffé bands, they still include zero for most of the cases. Pattern for 
 
 
Figure 2: Direct projection impulse responses of yt to shocks in t

 and t

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Pakistan is clearly consistent with the IREG hypothesis. For the horizons of 3 to 5 quarters (according to 
Scheffé bands) and 21 to 23 quarters, according to both Scheffé and Jordà bands, ( , )DyIR h
  increases 
and becomes significantly positive. For the same horizons, ( , )DyIR h
  decreases and becomes negative. 
Conclusion for Pakistan is that the positive real effect of an inflationary shock which occurs in a period 
of a positive difference between the expected and output-neutral inflation occurs with average delay 3-5 
quarters, with a possible additional long-delayed effect in 21-23 quarters. For two remaining countries 
the relationships are more complex. The IREG patters can be identified for Indonesia for the horizons of 
8-10 quarters, with insignificant IREG, but it is proceeded by a reverse IREG effect (output-neutral 
inflation is higher than expected inflation and the difference is significant) for h = 5-7 quarters. For 
Malaysia, a country without high inflation episodes, IREG is significant after 3 and 4 quarters of the 
shock, while a reverse pattern is observed for the horizons of 16-20 quarters, where ( , )DyIR h
  is 
significantly higher than ( , )DyIR h
 .  
5. IREG AND HIGH INFLATION 
Notwithstanding the mainly insignificant results for the differences between impulse responses for the 
periods of positive and negative IREG’s, we have attempted to test the possible relationship between 
gains (or losses) created by inflationary shocks in the period of positive IREG in relation to these in the 
period of negative IREG for the FEHI countries. In our dataset we have 17 countries where the 0.75
th
 
quantile of inflation is greater than 7.5%, which is where for 25% of quarters inflation was higher than 
7.5% during the span of the sample. As an aggregate benchmark we define a simple measure of IREG 
gain (IGAIN) as ( ,24) ( ,24)i i iy yIGAIN CIR CIR 
   , i={D,O}, which is easily interpretable as the 
total real gain (in the sense of output) from inflationary shock which takes place in the period of positive 
IREG in relation to the same happening in the period of negative IREG. Table 1 indicates whether such 
gain was positive (by +1) or negative (by -1). It is accompanied by an indicator whether possible gain is 
accompanied by a smaller variance component. More precisely, in columns (1) and (3), the value of 1 
indicates a situation where (in Appendix C) ( ,24) ( ,24)i iy yCIR CIR 
  , i={D,O} and -1 otherwise. 
Columns (2) and (4) display 1 if { ( )} { ( )}i iy yV IR V IR 
  , and -1 otherwise. One might look at one’s in 
columns (1) and (3) as a weak confirmation of IREG hypothesis (with the alternative use of the direct 
projection and orthogonal IR’s) and 1’s appearing in columns (1) and (2) or (3) and (4) simultaneously 
as its strong confirmation, as in this case greater real effect of inflation for t

 in relation to t

 is 
additionally accompanied by smaller output volatility. 
Table 1: Positive and negative IGAIN’s for FEHI countries 
 
Country, abbreviation   
DIGAIN      
OIGAIN  
         
(1) 
             
(2) 
     
(3) 
                
(4) 
Argentina, AR 1 -1 -1 -1 
Brazil, BR 1 -1 -1 -1 
Columbia, CL 1 1 1 1 
Hong Kong, HK 1 -1 1 1 
Hungary, HU 1 -1 -1 -1 
India, ID -1 -1 -1 -1 
Indonesia, IA -1 -1 -1 -1 
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Mexico, ME -1 -1 1 1 
Pakistan, PK 1 -1 1 -1 
Peru, PE 1 1 1 1 
Philippines, PH 1 -1 1 1 
Poland, PL 1 -1 1 1 
Portugal, PR 1 -1 -1 -1 
Romania, RO 1 -1 1 1 
Russia, RU 1 -1 1 -1 
Slovak Republic, SR 1 -1 1 1 
Turkey, TR 1 -1 1 -1 
Legend: 
(1) 1 if ( ,24) ( ,24)D Dy yCIR CIR 
  , -1 otherwise  
(2) if { ( )} { ( )}D Dy yV IR V IR 
  , -1 otherwise 
(3) 1 if ( ,24) ( ,24)O Oy yCIR CIR 
  , -1 otherwise  
(4) 1 if { ( )} { ( )}O Oy yV IR V IR 
  , -1 otherwise 
 
Table 1 shows an interesting pattern. According to the direct projection IR’s, for 14 out of 17 countries 
inflationary shocks which appear in periods of positive IREG contribute positively to an increase in 
output more strongly than analogous shocks in periods of negative IREG. However, in most cases (with 
the exception of Columbia and Peru) this positive contribution is associated with the increase in output 
volatility caused by inflationary shocks. Results for the orthogonal IR’s are somewhat less extreme. 
There are only 11 showing advantage of positive IREG for output, but in 8 out of these 11 cases there is 
actual reduction of inflation-induced volatility. It can be therefore concluded that for most of FEHI 
countries positive inflationary shocks in periods when expected inflation exceeds output-neutral 
inflation  
(IREG > 0) are better for the real sphere than otherwise (IREG < 0). However, whether this accompanied 
by an increase or decrease in output volatility, is not clear. 
Inquiring further for a possible relation between high inflation episodes are real effects we have 
computed correlation between the magnitude of IGAIN and the logartihm 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation. 
Figure 3 shows the results in the form of correlation diagram. For visibly identified points, country 
symbols, as in Table 1, are printed. Positive relationship is clear here, especially for the direct projection 
IRs. However, one might argue that this is a spurious result, due to a possibility of mistaking high 
inflation effect with that of IREG. In another words, if positive IREGs coincide with the episodes of high 
inflation, it might be high inflation which generates positive real effect, regardless IREG. 
In order to check this, let us define high-inflation loss HLOSS, in relation to IREG, as 
( ,24) ( ,24)i i i My yHLOSS CIR CIR 
  , i={D,O}, where ( ,24)i MyCIR   is a cumulative impulse 
response of output on inflationary shocks in the periods where, for each country, inflation is above its 
median. The technique used here is analogous to that explained in Section 2. For each country we have 
formulated a 3-equation VAR with yt, t

 and 
M
t , where
M
t t   if ( )t tmedian  ; and 0 otherwise. 
If all periods of positive IREG correspond to these of inflation being above the median, there would be 
perfect mulicollinearity and the model would not estimate. If it does estimate, but the gains from shocks 
in times of high inflation dominate gains from shocks in times of positive IREG in the sense that the 
gains grew faster with the increase of inflation during high inflation episodes, correlation of HLOSS 
with the 0.75th quantile of inflations should be negative or close to zero. If shocks during the times of  
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Figure 3: Correlation between IGAIN and log of 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation 
for FEHI countries 
DIGAIN  OIGAIN  
 
 
 
 
corr.coefficient = 0.61 corr.coefficient=0.66 
 
high inflation create the same real effect as t
 , the correlation should be the same as shown on Figure 3 
as, in this case, IGAIN=HLOSS. Finally, if the increase in real effects during high inflation episodes is 
smaller than during the periods of negative IREG, this correlation should be smaller than that in Figure 
3. As shown by Figure 4, these correlations are still positive, albeit markedly lower than these between 
IGAIN and the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation. This implies that the gains form high inflation raise slower 
than the gains from positive IREG with the increase in magnitude of inflation during high inflation 
episodes. Somewhat stylized reflection here could be that the best (in terms of output stimulation) 
situation occurs in FEHI countries where positive inflationary shock occurs in a period of positive 
IREG, regardless of the magnitude of inflation.  
Fig. 4: Correlation between HLOSS and log of 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation  
for FEHI group 
DHLOSS  OHLOSS  
 
 
 
 
corr.coefficient = 0.43 corr.coefficient=0.41 
 
Finally, we have checked to what extent the results depend on our, rather arbitrary, definition of the 
episodes of high inflation. Perhaps the positive relationship between IREG and inflation holds regardless 
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of the existence of such episodes? For checking this we have gradually relaxed the 7.5% limit for FEHI 
by lowering it systematically, so that the FEHI group incorporates more countries. First, the non-FEHI 
country with the highest 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation is included (as discussed above), then the country 
with the second highest quantile is added, etc.. For these gradually enlarging groups we have computed 
correlation coefficients as in Figure 3, that is between IGAIN and the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation. The 
results are shown in Figure 5. 
Solid upper line represents the upper critical bound of the correlation coefficient around zero at 1% level 
of significance, and the double line (lower) at 5% level of significance. It indicates that, generally, the 
higher is the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation, the higher is correlation of its logarithm with the inflationary 
real effect for periods of positive IREG, in comparison with periods of negative IREG. It also shows that 
the results are reasonably tolerant regarding the definition of FEHI. If we relax the definition and 
redefine the FEHI country as such where the 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation is greater than 4.8% rather than 
7.5%, the main result of the study, that is correlation between the logarithm this quantile and IGAIN, 
remains high. However, if we relax the FEHI definition further still, this correlation weakens markedly.  
 
Fig. 5: Correlation coefficients of IGAIN and log of 0.75
th
 quantile of inflation: 
FEHI group is increasing 
DIGAIN  OIGAIN  
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND SIMPLE POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
While agreeing with most of the mainstream literature that high inflation is an evil phenomenon, our 
results suggest a way of making the most of it by undertaking anti-inflationary monetary decisions in 
periods where the difference between the expected and output-neutral inflation is positive. In such cases 
the real sector pain caused by a negative inflationary shock resulted, for instance, from an increase in 
interest rate, would be lower than in the period where such difference is negative. The effect of such 
shock would be reasonably quickly absorbed, reducing inflation but not hurting the real sector badly. 
Reversely, if, in the period where inflationary expectations exceed output-neutral inflation, an output-
stimulating decision is made, its real effect would be greater than in the case of otherwise. We have 
shown that it is not enough just to watch high inflation episodes and react to the observed level on 
inflation. Sometimes it might pay to wait with the monetary decision until inflationary expectations are 
above output-neutral inflation even if the observed inflation is high.  
So where is a catch? We have identified three. Firstly, our findings are valid for most countries with 
markedly high inflation (over 4.8% in at least every fourth quarter on average) and are less effective for 
countries with intrinsically lower inflation. Secondly, it is not clear whether inflationary shocks in the 
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periods when expected inflation exceeds output neutral inflation, increases or decreases output volatility. 
Our results are conflicting here and cannot be generalised. Thirdly, our results, although statistically 
sound, are rather limited in terms of monetary policy and might be prone to misinterpretation. All we 
shown are some symptomatic evidences supporting the hypothesis that is pays to undertake monetary 
decision when the difference between the expected and output-neutral inflation is positive and additional 
evidence that this relationship becomes stronger with the increase in inflation. All beyond this is 
speculation. 
The model we use is very simple and with an obvious room for improvement. Output neutral inflation 
can be computed in a much more sophisticated way from disaggregated components of output and 
inflation. Impulse response analysis and testing can be done more precisely if a disaggregated model is 
used and, presumably, when the assumption of the multivariate normal distribution is relaxed. We are 
leaving this for further research. 
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APPENDIX A: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATASET 
 
The dataset consists of GDP growth and inflation for each country. The GDP growth is defined as the 
percentage change of the real GDP in a given quarter over the real GDP in the corresponding quarter of 
the previous year. Inflation is defined by the percentage change of the consumer price index (CPI) over 
the last year’s level in the corresponding quarter. Real GDP figures have been computed by deflating the 
nominal GDP by each country’s GDP deflator (source: from IMF International Financial Statistics, IFS, 
http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/ wds_ifs/) except for Indonesia, where the consumers’ price index, CPI, has 
been used as the deflator. For countries other than that of OECD and Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia and 
South Africa, inflation has been computed from the original CPI data.  Data on inflation for the 30 
OECD countries and 5 non-OECD countries listed above are from the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/). 
The GDP deflators for all 45 countries are from the IFS. Data for the nominal GDP for the non-OECD 
countries except for Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa have been obtained from the IFS, and for the 
remaining countries from OECD. For India and Pakistan some quarterly GDP data are converted from 
annual to quarterly frequencies using the polynomial quadratic interpolation. For India, annual GDP is 
interpolated for the period from 1991q1 to 1996q1, with the remaining data in this series from OECD. 
The annual nominal GDP series for India and Pakistan have been obtained from the OECD and IFS 
respectively, while the GDP deflators from IFS.  
Basic data characteristics and sources 
Country N. obs. First obs. Last obs. Inflation Data source for: 
    Average 0.75 quantile Inf. Deflator Nom. GDP 
Argentina 76 1993q01 2011q04 6.650 9.553 B B B 
Australia 124 1981q01 2011q04 4.420 6.855 A B A 
Austria 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.617 3.395 A B A 
Belgium 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.927 3.375 A B A 
Brazil 68 1995q01 2011q04 14.440 7.794 A B A 
Canada 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.318 4.150 A B A 
Chile 64 1996q01 2011q04 3.781 4.835 A B A 
Czech Republic 68 1995q01 2011q04 0.975 1.502 A B A 
Columbia 72 1994q01 2011q04 10.060 17.770 B B B 
Denmark 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.358 3.977 A B A 
Finland 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.349 4.658 A B A 
France 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.228 3.261 A B A 
Germany 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.208 2.835 A B A 
Hong Kong 121 1981q04 2011q04 4.570 9.164 B B B 
Hungary 68 1995q01 2011q04 9.680 10.600 A B A 
India 84 1991q01 2011q04 7.760 10.130 A B,D A,D 
Indonesia 88 1990q01 2011q04 11.080 10.210 A B,E B 
Ireland 60 1997q01 2011q04 2.585 4.649 A B A 
Israel 68 1995q01 2011q04 3.965 5.913 A B A 
Italy 124 1981q01 2011q04 5.152 6.066 A B A 
Japan 124 1981q01 2011q04 0.842 2.083 A B A 
Korea 124 1981q01 2011q04 4.877 5.603 A B A 
Luxembourg 68 1995q01 2011q04 2.088 2.728 A B A 
Malaysia 84 1991q01 2011q04 2.897 3.712 B B B 
Mexico 124 1981q01 2011q04 30.220 33.770 A B A 
Morocco 88 1990q01 2011q04 2.973 4.220 B B B 
Netherland 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.306 2.777 A B A 
New Zealand 99 1987q02 2011q04 3.145 3.977 A B A 
Norway 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.923 5.517 A B A 
Pakistan 124 1981q01 2011q04 8.510 10.920 B B,D B,D 
Peru 124 1981q01 2011q04 421.00 88.080 B B B 
Philippines 124 1981q01 2011q04 8.944 10.030 B B B 
Poland 68 1995q01 2011q04 7.287 9.886 A B A 
Portugal 124 1981q01 2011q04 8.107 11.490 A B A 
Country N. obs. First obs. Last obs. Inflation Data source for: 
    Average 0.75 quantile Inf. Deflator Nom. GDP 
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Romania 69 1994q04 2011q05 29.9575 42.2708 B,C B,C B,C 
Russia 68 1995q01 2011q04 32.100 20.950 A B A 
Slovak Republic 76 1993q01 2011q04 7.134 8.331 A B A 
Spain 124 1981q01 2011q04 1.257 1.921 A B A 
South Africa 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.245 3.286 A B A 
Sweden 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.792 6.442 A B A 
Switzerland 124 1981q01 2011q04 2.019 3.002 A B A 
Thailand 76 1993q01 2011q04 3.453 5.092 B B B 
Turkey 100 1987q01 2011q04 47.600 69.800 A B A 
United Kingdom 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.626 4.767 A B A 
United States 124 1981q01 2011q04 3.310 3.971 A B A 
Legend:  
A: data source: OECD  
B: data source: IFS, inflation recomputed from CPI data  
C: 1995q1-2000q4: data obtained directly from the Romanian Central Statistical Office 
D: Interpolated from annual data 
E: CPI index used as the deflator 
APPENDIX B:  SUMMARY OF VAR ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Country VAR lag Root Ljung-Box, P-values Jarque-Bera, P-values 
        Output               Inflation           Joint            Output             Inflation 
Argentina 7 1.093 0.812 0.981 0.391 0.000 0.000 
Australia 6 1.052 0.926 0.629 0.071 0.207 0.000 
Austria 7 1.131 0.161 0.820 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Belgium 8 1.137 0.666 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.208 
Brazil 5 1.266 0.954 0.096 0.369 0.000 0.000 
Canada 8 1.081 0.190 0.598 0.000 0.068 0.197 
Chile 5 1.132 0.906 0.899 0.051 0.002 0.858 
Czech Republic 6 1.086 0.939 0.087 0.097 0.107 0.379 
Columbia 6 1.113 0.193 0.585 0.002 0.587 0.367 
Denmark 8 1.102 0.007 0.369 0.000 0.487 0.508 
Finland 8 1.066 0.781 0.732 0.032 0.000 0.724 
France 8 1.094 0.100 0.301 0.000 0.043 0.980 
Germany 8 1.096 0.812 0.466 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Hong Kong 8 1.071 0.918 0.823 0.150 0.081 0.002 
Hungary 3 1.108 0.375 0.398 0.047 0.003 0.735 
India 8 1.063 0.960 0.901 0.173 0.000 0.095 
Indonesia 8 1.078 0.196 0.931 0.006 0.000 0.000 
Ireland 2 1.165 0.229 0.365 0.307 0.017 0.458 
Israel 6 1.093 0.619 0.644 0.017 0.305 0.077 
Italy 8 1.115 0.359 0.866 0.021 0.011 0.001 
Japan 8 1.067 0.168 0.370 0.001 0.000 0.008 
Korea 8 1.082 0.521 0.043 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Luxembourg 6 1.113 0.674 0.989 0.337 0.739 0.937 
Malaysia 8 1.118 0.543 0.980 0.091 0.000 0.000 
Mexico 8 1.054 0.456 0.984 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Morocco 5 1.050 0.044 0.672 0.006 0.119 0.000 
Netherland 7 1.138 0.192 0.499 0.020 0.000 0.896 
New Zealand 6 1.213 0.942 0.514 0.007 0.745 0.000 
Norway 8 1.045 0.232 0.431 0.004 0.385 0.003 
Pakistan 8 1.096 0.001 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peru 8 1.084 0.245 0.670 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Philippines 8 1.140 0.475 0.823 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Poland 4 1.096 0.906 0.444 0.090 0.038 0.598 
Portugal 4 1.099 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Romania 4 1.250 0.912 0.492 0.049 0.000 0.000 
Russia 5 1.255 0.632 0.955 0.028 0.046 0.000 
Slovak Republic 7 1.131 0.982 0.730 0.096 0.000 0.000 
Spain 8 1.001 0.135 0.995 0.003 0.000 0.419 
South Africa 7 1.050 0.181 0.486 0.006 0.010 0.107 
Sweden 8 1.069 0.811 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Country VAR lag Root Ljung-Box, P-values Jarque-Bera, P-values 
        Output               Inflation           Joint            Output             Inflation 
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Switzerland 7 1.105 0.633 0.691 0.036 0.027 0.745 
Thailand 6 1.116 0.642 0.401 0.022 0.478 0.258 
Turkey 4 1.040 0.176 0.037 0.002 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom 8 1.113 0.058 0.504 0.001 0.163 0.000 
United States 8 1.095 0.202 0.904 0.000 0.389 0.000 
 
 APPENDIX C: IMPULSE RESPONSES AND TEST RESULTS 
C1: Impulse responses from direct projections 
Country        (1)
 
           (2)
 
    (3)
 
         (4)
 
         Joint test
 
  Cumulative test
 
       F-stat         p-Value        F-stat         p-value 
Argentina 11.359 6.225 0.311 0.304 24.510 0.474 0.171 0.682 
Australia -2.145 0.270 0.595 0.354 16.782 0.838 1.810 0.182 
Austria -0.021 -0.165 0.659 0.349 18.564 0.757 0.008 0.929 
Belgium 6.033 -7.574 0.571 0.195 16.000 0.868 4.501 0.037 
Brazil 2.661 1.009 0.449 0.250 38.819 0.120 0.786 0.384 
Canada -3.023 0.663 0.432 0.492 23.464 0.504 2.747 0.102 
Chile -0.028 -0.341 0.395 0.345 31.538 0.265 0.072 0.791 
Czech Republic 0.317 0.133 0.457 0.508 39.574 0.117 0.008 0.930 
Columbia 1.877 -0.237 0.296 0.345 19.410 0.699 0.638 0.431 
Denmark 0.366 -1.475 0.491 0.196 24.026 0.476 0.871 0.354 
Finland 1.363 -8.251 0.516 0.164 20.960 0.635 4.527 0.037 
France 1.553 0.154 0.518 0.233 20.357 0.666 0.679 0.413 
Germany -1.222 0.896 0.424 0.329 26.724 0.351 0.779 0.380 
Hong Kong 7.226 -1.020 0.647 0.507 38.556 0.064 2.800 0.099 
Hungary 5.177 3.426 0.347 0.174 30.099 0.278 0.551 0.464 
India -1.622 -0.581 0.535 0.180 32.699 0.198 0.414 0.524 
Indonesia -12.537 2.578 0.385 0.320 23.403 0.515 1.964 0.169 
Ireland -3.771 13.093 0.534 0.363 13.580 0.913 4.013 0.057 
Israel -1.204 0.260 0.512 0.592 44.445 0.072 0.405 0.531 
Italy -1.414 -0.557 0.528 0.229 28.562 0.279 0.517 0.475 
Japan -0.271 -2.641 0.561 0.681 11.762 0.974 0.348 0.557 
Korea 6.688 5.493 0.493 0.336 30.544 0.213 0.035 0.852 
Luxembourg -0.663 0.143 0.453 0.272 23.203 0.533 0.094 0.762 
Malaysia 0.175 1.526 0.618 0.355 28.560 0.314 0.311 0.581 
Mexico -0.422 2.156 0.576 0.316 16.384 0.853 0.263 0.610 
Morocco 1.879 -5.756 0.564 0.462 18.333 0.758 3.932 0.053 
Netherland 2.232 -2.339 0.605 0.311 15.697 0.879 2.545 0.115 
New Zealand -3.327 -1.852 0.337 0.434 14.890 0.899 0.294 0.590 
Norway -1.448 0.210 0.767 0.451 15.962 0.869 0.772 0.382 
Pakistan -0.272 -2.300 0.554 0.171 27.482 0.320 0.782 0.379 
Peru 5.059 -11.855 0.358 0.812 56.614 0.003 2.386 0.127 
Philippines 4.037 -4.809 0.519 0.190 26.053 0.380 5.568 0.021 
Poland 0.844 -1.106 0.382 0.343 17.175 0.795 0.536 0.471 
Portugal 1.110 0.537 0.672 0.434 16.161 0.863 0.048 0.826 
Romania -8.289 -21.994 N/A 0.174 20.312 0.658 0.174 0.680 
Russia 2.023 0.921 0.559 0.091 34.767 0.182 0.064 0.802 
Slovak Republic 1.289 -4.518 0.735 0.344 45.594 0.050 3.649 0.066 
Spain -0.006 -4.953 0.728 0.447 20.106 0.679 2.905 0.092 
South Africa -1.205 -2.179 0.563 0.666 18.293 0.770 0.104 0.748 
Sweden 2.454 1.693 0.710 0.199 26.706 0.352 0.169 0.683 
Switzerland -0.867 -0.462 0.476 0.207 23.057 0.525 0.051 0.822 
Thailand 0.098 2.798 0.488 0.311 24.754 0.462 0.508 0.481 
Turkey 15.824 -6.553 0.435 0.252 30.643 0.221 3.538 0.065 
United Kingdom 3.751 -5.682 0.620 0.102 32.135 0.170 11.819 0.001 
United States -5.028 -0.527 0.497 0.512 21.435 0.610 3.844 0.054 
Legend:  (1) ( ,24)DCIR
y
  , (2)  ( ,24)DCIR
y
  , (3) { ( )}DyV IR 
  , (4) { ( )}DyV IR 
    
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C2: Orthogonal impulse responses 
Country                  (1)
 
                     (2)
 
                     (3)
 
                   (4)
 
Argentina 4.536 23.227 0.017 0.414 
Australia -1.484 0.031 0.129 0.009 
Austria 0.236 -0.665 0.034 0.093 
Belgium -1.527 -4.818 0.038 0.168 
Brazil -1.044 -0.593 0.037 0.175 
Canada -2.500 1.033 0.061 0.050 
Chile -1.179 -3.157 0.109 0.375 
Czech Republic -0.311 -4.541 0.050 0.119 
Columbia 0.073 -2.181 0.139 0.186 
Denmark -0.082 -4.676 0.010 0.237 
Finland -0.585 -10.661 0.056 0.238 
France -0.915 -1.231 0.041 0.284 
Germany -0.546 -0.029 0.081 0.073 
Hong Kong 0.416 -0.036 0.033 0.075 
Hungary -1.856 0.953 0.024 0.020 
India -2.273 -1.755 0.189 0.181 
Indonesia -12.957 -2.933 0.255 0.111 
Ireland 1.133 -4.438 0.012 0.108 
Israel -1.203 0.783 0.065 0.098 
Italy -1.086 0.449 0.072 0.057 
Japan -0.519 -3.084 0.058 0.222 
Korea 1.810 -1.193 0.018 0.038 
Luxembourg 1.710 -2.929 0.030 0.082 
Malaysia -3.225 -0.256 0.145 0.263 
Mexico 1.225 0.550 0.012 0.039 
Morocco 0.133 -2.090 0.039 0.058 
Netherland -1.160 -0.915 0.019 0.026 
New Zealand 0.322 -4.563 0.014 0.168 
Norway -2.710 0.331 0.067 0.014 
Pakistan 0.505 -2.832 0.107 0.069 
Peru 5.388 -16.713 0.147 0.236 
Philippines 1.298 -4.521 0.042 0.051 
Poland -0.498 -2.313 0.067 0.140 
Portugal -0.101 3.260 0.046 0.117 
Romania -37.515 -41.623 0.048 0.072 
Russia 0.667 -1.619 0.024 0.021 
Slovak Republic 0.839 -7.061 0.063 0.224 
Spain -0.764 -3.015 0.012 0.071 
South Africa -1.886 -3.496 0.077 0.193 
Sweden 2.290 -3.658 0.066 0.092 
Switzerland -2.120 -1.719 0.042 0.071 
Thailand -1.209 -1.083 0.087 0.070 
Turkey 6.620 -8.318 0.136 0.023 
United Kingdom 1.992 -4.350 0.071 0.162 
United States -2.134 0.432 0.122 0.063 
Legend:  (1) ( ,24)OCIR
y
  , (2)  ( ,24)OCIR
y
  , (3) { ( )}OyV IR 
  , (4) { ( )}OyV IR 
    
 
 
